Abstract. Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of individuals. Individuals' interests in freedom of religion and association are said to be served through religious groups being granted a level of autonomy from state control, which includes their enjoying exemptions from certain otherwise applicable laws. All such justifications face a significant problem, however, which is that religious groups invariably contain dissenters, who object to the group's decisions, policies, or current exercise of an exemption. It is unclear how these internal dissenters' interests are served by the group being granted exemptions. This chapter explores, and seeks to resolve, this problem. I show that three standard liberal responses-appealing to the religious groups' own decision-making procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rightscontain important insights, but do not provide a satisfactory solution. I then argue that liberal political theory nonetheless has the resources to justify exemptions for religious groups in the face of internal dissent, by highlighting the way in which dissenters' own interest in freedom of religion can be protected and promoted through religious group autonomy. This enables liberal theorists to justify internally contested exemptions for religious groups.
Introduction
Religious groups often seek a level of autonomy from state control. They desire an area in which they exercise self-governance, allowing them to structure their collective life according to their own religious and ethical precepts, without interference from the state. As Douglas Laycock puts it, 'a church autonomy claim is a claim to autonomous management of a religious organization's internal affairs '. 1 This kind of religious group autonomy is manifested in various ways within liberal societies, including through groups' being able to define their doctrines and beliefs, choose their members and leaders, set standards of conduct, and discipline those who violate those standards, all justifies certain infringements on individuals' other Convention rightsand thus exemptions from the requirements that would otherwise apply. 5 In the USA, the 'ministerial exception', affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2012, gives churches even greater autonomy within their ministerial employment decisions, which are deemed to be outside the purview of the state. 6 The Court stated that 'requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister… interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs'.
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Some liberal theorists have argued against these various kinds of corporate religious exemptions 8 , including in relation to church's employment decisions. 9 Most, however, endorse some form of religious group autonomy that would permit some such exemptions. 10 Some legal theorists focused on UK law have even argued that it ought to incorporate a narrow version of the US-style ministerial exception.
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The nature and scope of religious group autonomy has become increasingly controversial, however. In part, this is due to recent court decisions. The US Supreme Court has offered an expansive interpretation of the ministerial exception, and the ECtHR has permitted European states to side with church hierarchies in several recent employment disputes, even when other Convention rights were implicated. 12 More generally, the growing reach of state regulation has made conflicts with religious groups' claims to autonomy increasingly common, and thus raised new questions about that autonomy's proper scope. 13 These questions concern both the areas within which religious organisations should be granted exemptions and which organisations count as 'religious' in a way that makes them eligible for those exemptions.
The resolution of disputes over the scope of religious group autonomy depends upon its justification. Recent controversies have therefore led to a flurry of justifications being offered. Liberal justifications for group autonomy hold that the interests of individuals are its ultimate normative basis. Group autonomy is the conclusion of an argument that is grounded in individualistic normative premises. 14 Various liberal justifications have been offered in the literature. All such accounts face a significant problem, however, which is that religious groups always contain dissenters-individuals who are members of the group but disagree with its current policies, doctrines, or structures. For example, these individuals might disagree with the group's current exercise of a corporate exemption. Or they might believe that they have been discriminated against in ways that ought to be legally redressed. Many of the cases that come to court involve (former) church employees who claim unfair dismissal, dis-11 eg Nicholas Hatzis, 'The Church-Clergy Relationship and Anti-Discrimination Law ' (2013) crimination, or violation of some other right. If the focus is on the interests of individuals, then it is unclear how these internal dissenters' interests are promoted by the group being granted exemptions, or more generally enjoying an area of autonomy.
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This chapter explores this problem of internal dissenters, and ultimately seeks to defend corporate religious exemptions in the face of it, while remaining within the parameters of liberal theory. The chapter is structured as follows. First, I show in more detail why the presence of internal dissenters creates a problem for liberal justifications of corporate exemptions. I then consider three ways that liberal theorists might respond to the problem: appealing to religious groups' own decisionmaking procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rights. All of these arguments have some force, but none provide a fully satisfactory solution.
Finally, I seek to develop my own solution, which builds on the insights contained in the various arguments we will encounter, but more directly confronts the problem by arguing that internal dissenters' own interest in freedom of religion can be promoted through religious groups enjoying a significant level of autonomy, including various corporate exemptions.
My argument does not provide a full answer to questions regarding the scope of religious group autonomy, but it does offer some guidance. More importantly, it resolves a fundamental problem for liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups.
Liberal Justifications and the Problem of Internal Dissent
Liberal justifications for corporate exemptions appeal to the interests of individuals, and claim that those interests are best served, in certain contexts, by religious institutions being granted significant autonomy to control their own membership, structure, and ethos. Some of these arguments seek to justify exemptions by reference to rights held by individu- 
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'Coherence interests' concern the group's ability to live by its own standards, purposes, and commitments by aligning its purpose, structure, and ethos. They are interests in sustaining group integrity. 'Competence interests' concern the group's distinctive ability to interpret it's own standards, purposes, and commitments. An association can permissibly discriminate in its membership and leadership when this reflects its central doctrine and mission and/or when it has special competence to judge the relevant criteria for the office. These two salient group interests arise from individuals' exercise of their freedom of association in forming and sustaining the group, so groups' rights to exemptions are derived from the liberal value of freedom of association.
These arguments, and others like them, seek to justify some kind of religious group autonomy, including certain corporate exemptions. Third, internal dissenters are free to leave the group and form or join another group whose beliefs better align with their own. All three of these responses contain important insights. But all three also have significant weaknesses, which prevent them from providing a complete answer to the problem of internal dissent. In the following three sections I will consider these responses in turn, in order to highlight both their strengths and limitations. While I argue that they are insufficient to solve the problem of internal dissenters, I do not mean to reject them completely; indeed, all three play a role within my own answer to the problem, which I present later in the chapter.
Internal Decision-Making
The first response is to hold that religious groups should be granted the This is clearest in Shorten's examination of groups' rights to institutional exemptions. 30 Shorten argues that while it is religious institutions who are granted the legal right to an exemption, the moral right attaches instead to the group of individuals on whose behalf the institution acts.
The normative justification for the exemption comes from those individuals' interests in freedom of religion and association. The gap between the legal and moral right can be bridged only if decision-making agents within the institution have legitimate normative authority to exercise the exemption, and this is the case only if those agents are authorised by the group to act on its behalf. It seems, however, that for this kind of authorisation to occur the members of the group either must all share the same view of how the exemption ought to be exercised or must democratically authorise the decision-agent and/or their decisions. 31 The former condition obviously is not met in cases where there is internal dissent, so the latter condition-democratic decision-making-must be met if the exemption is to be justified. All who unite themselves to [a religious association] do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
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The main problem with this argument is that in many cases it appears descriptively inaccurate. Many members of religious groups were inducted into those groups as children, and even those who join as adults rarely do so with full knowledge of all of the groups' doctrines, structures or decision-making procedures. It thus seems a stretch to hold that they have in some way consented to all of those things. And it is certainly implausible to view most individuals as giving consent to a fixed, monolithic set of beliefs, rules and hierarchies, since few religious groups are static or homogeneous in this way. The very problem of internal dissent arises precisely because religious communities are always sites of debate and contestation, in a way that makes it difficult to identify precisely what individuals can be said to have consented to. This is true even for groups' decision-making procedures and structures of authority; these matters are also often contested, and it is unclear that the majority of members can be said to have given consent to them simply through joining the group.
These points are ably summarised by B. Jessie Hill, who has critiqued the implied consent argument at length:
In fact, religious membership is probably best understood not as a form of consent to a particular set of precepts or a particular dispute-resolution mechanism, but rather as membership in a dynamic community, whose contours are constantly subject to contestation. This being the case, however, the normative heavy lifting must be done by that underlying argument, not by implied consent itself. 39 And that means that the notion of implied consent cannot do independent work in response to the problem of internal dissent. We need some other argument for corporate exemptions in the face of internal dissent, before we can use implied consent as a label for this conclusion. But that other argument is exactly what we are searching for.
One might think that one form of consent can do independent work, however. Even if members of a religious group do not consent to all of its beliefs, rules and authority structures by joining the group, perhaps they give implied consent by staying in the group. This brings us to the third response to the problem of internal dissent: an appeal to exit rights.
Exit Rights
A very common liberal response to dissenters within religious (and other) groups is to hold that they are free to leave the group, and to join or form another group whose beliefs or practices better fit with their own. The freedom to exit is the ultimate guarantee of each individual's freedom of religion and association. 39 This is explicitly recognised by at least one of the theorists to whom Hill attributes the implied consent argument. Lund writes that implied consent might be a useful label to capture the normative situation, but is not doing the real normative work. 'Implied consent is a fiction used to operationalize the constitutional right of churches to have control over their own decisions' (Lund, 'Free Exercise Reconceived', 1200). The actual argument for that right must be found elsewhere.
rules on members and employees, it will not allow any group to prevent individuals from leaving. Even the most ardent supporters of a strong form of religious group autonomy endorse this substantive limit upon it, due to its fundamental importance to protecting individual interests.
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As Christopher Lund puts this point:
An important aspect of church autonomy is how every insider has the right to leave, the right to become an outsider. Maybe this is part of the church autonomy principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church autonomy. But either way, church autonomy implies a constitutional right of exit from religious organizations.
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Lund explicitly links a lack of exit, in the presence of exit rights, to a form of consent: 'People can leave or stay. But so long as they choose to stay, they accept how the church handles its religious affairs'. 42 The normatively salient kind of implied consent is given by staying within the group.
The ECtHR has also expressed this view: 'in the event of any doctrinal or organisational disagreement between a religious community and one of its members, the individual's freedom of religion is exercised by the option of freely leaving the community'.
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Exit rights are certainly an important part of a satisfactory answer to the problem of internal dissent. 44 But even this argument faces an important challenge, which is that it is not clear that freedom of exit is a sufficient protection for dissenting individuals' interests, in the light of the very arguments that justify religious group autonomy in the first place. For many people, the freedom to develop and fully exercise a conception of the good requires that they be able to live in accordance with their religious convictions, which in turn presupposes the existence of certain religious institutions. The political structure chosen under the original position accordingly would be one that afforded such religious institutions special protections.
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A notable feature of these arguments is that they rely on the particular importance to individuals of existing and well-established institutions. This is true, explicitly or implicitly, in many liberal accounts of religious group autonomy. Most religious individuals exercise their freedom of religion and association through membership in a pre-existing group, and their interests are invested in that particular community.
In the light of this, exiting a religious group into which one has been inducted and socialised comes at a high cost, and this cost is hardly mitigated by the ability to join or establish some new group. and pastoral commitment to their current denomination.
The very premises concerning the relationship between individuals' interests and religious group autonomy that justify corporate exemptions seem to make the freedom of exit response to internal dissenters insufficient. Exit rights will certainly be a necessary feature of an adequate response, as I discuss below. But they cannot work alone.
Justifying Deference to Religious Groups' Procedures
One response to my arguments thus far would be to conclude that reli- the religious institutions' own decision-making procedures in the presence of internal dissent. In particular, a critic could ask why the state should prioritise religious groups' competence interests in the face of complaints by internal dissenters who believe both that the group has got its religious judgements wrong and that they have been unjustly treated or discriminated against. Given the conflict of interest between the group authorities and dissenting individuals, it is not clear that the competence interest of the former are sufficient to justify a prohibition on the state from acting on behalf of the later.
So are further arguments available that explicitly defend group autonomy in the face of internal dissent? I think that there are, and will develop my own account in the next section. This account draws upon several of the arguments we have already encountered but includes crucial further elements that provide a stronger grounding for internally contested corporate exemptions.
Group Autonomy in the Face of Internal Dissent
The key to solving the problem of internal dissent is to recognise that even dissenters can be exercising their religious freedom by being part of the group, and thus their religious freedom, as well as that of other group members, is protected by the state's non-interference. The religious freedom of all individuals, including the dissenters, is dependent on groups being given a certain level of autonomy. I take it that this is the idea that Ahdar and Leigh, Rosen, and the ECtHR are pointing toward, but it requires further explication if it is to justify their conclusions.
Internal dissenters believe that their religious group's current rules or structures are wrong, and want to see them changed. In the extreme cases that come to court, the dissenter believes that a particular decision made by the group was unjust or wrongfully discriminatory, and should be overturned by the state. In this sense, therefore, they believe that their interests are not adequately taken into account by the group, and that protection for those interests requires changes to the group's decisions or structures.
Nonetheless, respect for religious group autonomy protects the religious freedom even of these individuals, because that respect is what ensures that all individuals can unite around and practice particular religious conceptions. If the law sides with dissenters then this freedom will be liable to be overruled whenever there is internal dissent. Even if the individual's particular interest in (not) being treated in a certain way by the group seems to be ill-served by group autonomy in the specific case at hand, her broader interest in the freedom to form and pursue her own religious conception is protected. Everyone benefits from group autonomy, in this sense, even if some also bear costs.
Up to now I have presented the problem of internal dissent as a conflict of interests, with the group on one side and the dissenter on the other. The arguments for group autonomy that I have considered each try to show that the group's interest is overriding, or that the strength of the dissenter's interest should be given lesser weight-on account of her implied consent or exit rights, for example. 56 My central point in the previous sections was that these arguments do not seem to give adequate weight to the dissenter's interests.
My point here is that we can instead hold that everyone has interests on the side of group autonomy, even if dissenters might also have interests on the other side. We are not simply weighing the interests of the group against those of the individual; we are weighing the individual's own interest in religious freedom, along with that of the other members of the group, against her interest in a particular form of treatment in the specific case at hand. It is the fact that the dissenter also has interests on the group autonomy side of the equation that can justify granting that autonomy.
Lund argues that religious group autonomy protects everyone's freedom to practice their own understanding of the faith, because it prevents individuals from using the law to control others' religious choices. The extra emphasis that needs to be added to Lund's argument here is that not allowing dissenters to shape the group via litigation protects the religious freedom even of those who are seeking to do the shaping. This is not only a case of protecting the group's religious freedom against the claims of dissenters; it also about protecting the religious freedom of the dissenters themselves. It protects their general interest in not being forced to practice their religion in ways that they reject or with peo- 
Internal Dissenters or Liberal Congruence?
Up to now I have assumed that the liberal concern is for 'internal dissenters'-individuals within religious groups who disagree with their policies or structures. The reply to this concern is that even internal dissenters can be exercising their religious freedom by being part of the group, and if the law regularly sides with the individual then it means there is no way to protect collective freedom to unite around religious conceptions, since this freedom will be overruled whenever there is internal dissent.
But perhaps the assumption that the concern is with all internal dissenters is mistaken. After all, internal dissenters are just as likely to be conservative as progressive. The upshot of this, however, is that the argument no longer concerns internal dissenters at all. Male-only priesthood would be ruled out even if no members of the group objected to it. The argument instead is simply about enforcing liberal egalitarian values upon religious groups who believe that they have religious or moral reasons to deviate from those values within their associational life. In effect, this approach holds that it is impermissible for individuals to form groups on the basis of nonliberal beliefs or practices. In other words, it endorses the 'logic of congruence', 67 according to which all civil society groups must be structured in accordance with the same values and principles that inform the liberal democratic state. Some advocates of religious group autonomy have expressed concern that the law might be heading in this direction. The Court does not ask whether churches should be exempt from employment discrimination laws. Instead, the Court asks whether churches have the right to choose their leaders. This is more than a clever rhetorical flourish-it a change in baseline.
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This is not to say that churches have complete jurisdictional authority, or enjoy a kind of 'sphere sovereignty' that prevents any kind of government regulation. The kind of religious group autonomy that I have discussed, and defended, falls short of 'sphere sovereignty'. 72 There are clear cases where a concern for the interests of individuals will mean penalising groups-such as when group members or leaders have been subject to sexual harassment or physical abuse, 73 or when groups have not adequately protected exit rights. My argument for religious group autonomy depends on balancing the interests of individuals, and this balancing leads to a robust but not absolute form of autonomy.
The precise kinds of government examination of, and intervention in, groups' decisions that are deemed (un)acceptable will depend on further details of the argument and of specific cases. I lack space to explore these detailed implications here, but believe that my account would justi- 
